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(Admin).
Queens Bench Division, Administrative Court (8th January 2004) Mr. Justice Munby.
The Facts
This case concerns alleged breaches by Islington of its duties under section 47 of the National
Health Service and Community Care Act 19901. The judgment relates to the one issue unresolved by
the time of the hearing, held on 15th December 2003, namely the adequacy of the community care
assessment of Mr P by Islington LBC dated 18th March 20032.
The London Borough of Islington’s policy Mental Health Assessment Priorities and Entitlement Criteria
distinguished between Care Programme Approach (CPA) assessments and Community Care
assessments (which relate to the provision of community care services other than under the Care
Programme Approach). Where severe and enduring mental health needs existed, the adult mental
health services would be responsible for future care. Where they did not, generic health or social
services would be responsible. Eligibility for the CPA was determined by a list of illnesses, including
persistent psychotic illness, depressive illness and other disorders where the risk of self-harm or harm
to others had been serious enough for a hospital admission to have been considered within the
previous two years3. The lawfulness of the policy had not been challenged in the proceedings.
The P family were Albanian asylum seekers from Kosovo. One member of the family, a six year
old son, had been shot dead there by Serbian troops, whilst another, a teenage son, had been
tortured. As a result of the traumatic events in Kosovo, Mr P had exhibited signs of depression
and a loss of the will to live. Without the assistance of his family, the evidence suggested that he
would not have been able to look after himself or even get out of bed. Prior to these events, he had
* Barrister; Mind Legal Unit (London)
1 Under section 47(1), the local authority must carry out
an assessment of a person’s needs for community care
services if “it appears to the authority that any person
for whom they may provide or arrange for the provision
of community care services may be in need of any such
services”
2 Para 1 of the judgment
3 ibid
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lived a normal life and had worked to support the family.
A report following a visit from a community mental health nurse indicated that Mr P was unwilling
to be interviewed and that he presented with symptoms suggestive of a depressive episode with
psychotic symptoms, and possible symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. A consultant
psychiatrist, Dr McK, concluded in August 2002 that he was suffering from reactive depression and
possibly the early stages of dementia, although Mr P’s lack of English made this difficult to assess
properly. Even under normal circumstances Mr P would have had only a fairly low level of
function. On the same day, Islington wrote to Mr P’s solicitors that Mr P was not sectionable under
the Mental Health Act 1983. He did not, in other words, satisfy the criteria for compulsory
admission to hospital and detention under the powers provided by the Act4.
On 18th March 2003, Dr B, Dr McK’s specialist registrar, visited Mr P and reported in a letter
written on the same day that there was no evidence of the abnormal perception or auditory
hallucinations which had presented previously, that Mr P had experienced some improvement
while on his medication with respect to the paranoid symptoms, but there remained evidence of
depressive symptoms.
On the same date, following a CPA meeting, a final version of Mr P’s health and social care
assessment was signed by Mr P’s social worker and her team manager. It concluded that Mr P did
not have a firm psychiatric diagnosis but might be suffering from reactive depression resulting from
the traumatic events he had experienced in Kosovo. The depression was described as “reasonably
appropriate to his circumstances”5 and was not a severe and enduring mental illness. At the same
time, however, he was assessed as being at risk of severe self-neglect and vulnerable to deterioration
in his mental state “particularly if he stops taking his medication.”6
The “statement of need” identified needs under five headings:
(1) a need for prompting to attend to all aspects of daily living including personal care;
(2) a need for reminders to take medication;
(3) treatment with depression and bereavement issues;
(4) safe accommodation with more privacy for Mr P and his family; and
(5) a requirement of support with socialising.
The outcome of the assessment was that Mr P did not meet the eligibility criteria for care
management7.
The CPA community care plan broadly repeated the needs identified in the first document. With
the exception of the housing needs, which were to be met by the local authority, all the assessed
needs were to be met by provision of support from Mr P’s family.
These assessments were challenged immediately by Mr P’s solicitors. On 1st April 2003, an
independent social work report was obtained, which concluded that Mr P should be placed on an
enhanced CPA on account of his “complex and long term mental health needs”8 and that he was
4 The criteria for civil detention, outside the criminal
justice system, are contained in sections 2(2) and 3(2)
Mental Health Act 1983, and are not identical. It is
not clear which criteria, those within section 2 or those
within section 3, were being referred to in the
Authority’s letter; see also footnote 21
5 Para 9 of the judgment
6 ibid
7 Para 10
8 Para 13
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likely to be suffering from a psychotic illness, not a reactive depression. Further, according to the
report, the effect of this on his daily functioning indicated that he should fulfil the criteria for care
management and should be allocated a Care Co-ordinator9. In consequence two letters of
complaint issued from P’s solicitors in April 2003 criticising the quality of the community care
assessment.
The London Borough of Islington responded on 25th April 2003, explaining that Mr P had been
seen by two psychiatrists as part of the community care assessment and that the decision had been
made not to provide community care services as Mr P did not have a severe and enduring mental
illness10.
The Islington Crisis Resolution Team discharged him on 27th May 2003 following an apparent
improvement in his mental state. 
On 10th June 2003, the solicitors obtained an independent psychiatrist’s report from Dr H, which
contradicted that of the London Borough of Islington, concluding that Mr P was suffering from
severe depression with psychotic symptoms, which was a very severe mental illness. He fulfilled the
ICD 1011 Diagnostic Criteria for Category F32.3, having suffered depressive symptoms of a
psychotic intensity and been unwell for over two years. There was also concern that Mr P might
be suffering from an organic brain disorder linked to a history of head injury. The symptoms of
his depressive disorder were, moreover, being aggravated by noise from the neighbours. Mr P was
therefore in need of regular supervision by mental health services, and without the support of his
family would need in-patient care. The report recommended that they should also be well
supported and given some respite if possible.
The London Borough of Islington refused to accept Dr H’s conclusions, replying that as Mr P had
no community care needs, no carer’s assessment was required to be undertaken of B, Mr P’s son,
who was caring for his father12. A file note written by the social worker on the same day indicated
that there was insufficient evidence for changing Mr P’s assessment, that the case should now be
closed and the carers’ assessment cancelled. On 15th July 2003 Islington wrote to Mr P’s solicitors
confirming its decision that Mr P did not have a severe and enduring mental illness “thus
warranting Community Care provision”13.
Issues
Four complaints were raised on behalf of Mr P.
(1) The first complaint was founded on the statement in the 18th March 2003 health and social care
assessment that there was no firm psychiatric diagnosis of Mr P. It was argued that it was therefore
unlawful, in the absence of such a diagnosis, for Islington to conclude that Mr P did not have a
need for community care services and/or that he did not meet its CPA eligibility criteria.
9 ibid
10 Para 14; emphasis added
11 The International Statistical Classification of Diseases
and Related Health Problems, 1989 Revision, Geneva,
World Health Organization, 1992
12 Under the Carers (Recognition and Services) Act 1995
there is a duty, upon request, on the local authority to
conduct an assessment of the ability of a carer to
provide and continue to provide care; the Carers and
Disabled Children Act 2000 now provides for a carer
to be assessed at any time, not only when an assessment
is being conducted of the needs of the person being
cared for
13 Para 22 of the judgment (emphasis added by Munby J)
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(2) That the London Borough of Islington failed to reconsider its assessment in the light of the
independent psychiatric report from Dr H. 
(3) That the authority had erred in its conclusion that Mr P did not meet its CPA eligibility criteria,
especially as he had been considered for hospital admission within the previous two years.
(4) The final complaint, the fourth, was that even if Mr P did not meet the CPA criteria owing to
the lack of a severe and enduring mental illness, this could not determine whether he had a need
for generic health or social services community care.
Judgment
(1) Diagnosis Issue
This argument was rejected by Munby J, confusing as it did two different kinds of statement: one,
that there was no firm diagnosis of any condition whatsoever, the other, that there was no firm
diagnosis of a particular condition, but which would be consistent with a firm diagnosis of some
other condition14. It is one thing to say that there is no firm psychiatric diagnosis, quite another to
say there is no firm diagnosis of anything at all. Here there was a firm diagnosis, but not of a
psychiatric illness falling within the CPA eligibility criteria. It was a diagnosis of reactive
depression, on which basis the London Borough of Islington was entitled to proceed, and on the
view of their doctors and social worker that Mr P was not suffering from any psychiatric illness
within the eligibility criteria15.
(2) Reconsideration of Medical Opinions
This complaint was factually incorrect. Munby J was of the opinion that the real substance of the
complaint was different. Rather, it appeared to be an assertion that, in the face of the clear
diagnosis of the independent psychiatrist Dr H, Islington could not continue to rely on the
uncertain diagnoses of Dr McK and his specialist registrar, Dr B. It was therefore, ran the
argument, irrational to reject Dr H’s diagnosis16.
The complaint also appeared to allege an absence of reasons in Islington’s decision, with no
indication of whether Dr H’s diagnosis was dismissed as wrong or whether, in Islington’s view, Mr
P remained ineligible for services irrespective of a correct diagnosis17.
Munby J rejected this latter assertion on the grounds that Islington’s refusal to review its decision
was clearly based on an acceptance of Dr McK’s opinion in preference to that of Dr H18. There
was no doubt that Dr McK had read Dr H’s report; he was, however, merely standing by his earlier
opinion. Islington was simply maintaining its position that Mr P did not have a psychiatric
condition within the CPA eligibility criteria qualifying him for community care provision.
Moreover, Islington’s decision could not be said to be Wednesbury19 unreasonable. It could be
argued that Dr H’s independent report was based on a more recent visit and more up to date
information than that available to either Dr McK or Dr B. In the opinion of Munby J, however,
both medical opinions were worthy of careful consideration and neither could be said to be so
14 Para 26
15 ibid
16 Para 27
17 ibid
18 Para 28
19 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury
Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
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obviously right as to justify rejecting the other. The views expressed earlier by Dr McK and Dr B,
combined with those expressed by Dr McK on reading Dr H’s report, did supply a rational basis
for rejecting Dr H’s diagnosis. Either opinion was one which a reasonable authority could have
chosen to follow20.
(3) Did Mr P meet the CPA eligibility criteria?
The eligibility test was a two-fold one. It depended on the existence of a relevant illness or disorder
which also must be sufficiently serious to merit possible hospital admission. Here the authority
had determined that Mr P was not sectionable at all21, and therefore this argument advanced on
behalf of Mr P was also unsustainable. In the estimation of Munby J, Islington had not
misunderstood or misapplied its own criteria22.
(4) Community Care other than under the Care Programme Approach
This proposition was one which Munby J had no hesitation in accepting23. He also agreed with the
argument advanced on behalf of Mr P that there had never been a proper Community Care
assessment, only a CPA assessment24.
The assessments of March 2003 identified some serious and pressing needs, as well as establishing
that Mr P was at risk of severe self-neglect and “vulnerable to deterioration in his mental state”25.
It could not be said that there was no need for investigation. Islington’s duty was to produce a
“needs assessment” identifying needs which could be met by service provision and then to arrive
at a “service provision decision”26. This would confirm whether the needs were such as to warrant
provision of services by the authority.
Even if it were to be assumed that the first stage of the process had been carried out properly
(about which there was doubt) it was clear that the second stage had not been carried out properly
or lawfully. Islington had committed an error of law in applying its decision on Mr P’s CPA
eligibility to the quite different question of his need for generic health or social services
community care27. It was not merely an administrative matter of filling in the wrong forms28. The
inherently flawed nature of its reasoning was revealed in crucial passages contained in letters from
Islington29 linking the decision not to provide community care services with the absence of a severe
and enduring mental illness. The wrong test had been applied.
The effect of the error was not only to invalidate the second stage of the process, the service
provision decision, but also to cast doubt on the valid execution of the first part, the “needs
20 Para 32
21 See footnote 4; in the case of section 2(2) Mental
Health Act 1983, the following criteria would need to
be satisfied: “An application for assessment may be
made ... on the grounds that – (a) he is suffering from
a mental disorder of a nature or degree which warrants
the detention of the patient in a hospital for assessment
... for at least a limited period; and (b) he ought to be
so detained in the interests of his own health or safety
or with a view to the protection of other persons.”
22 Para 36
23 Para 37
24 ibid
25 Para 38
26 ibid
27 This could have been, for example, under section 47(1)
National Health Service and Community Care Act
1990, for social care needs; or Standard Two of the
National Health Service Framework for Mental
Health, Circular HSC 1999/223: LAC (99) 34, which
offers medical assessment and treatment to service users
(including those not within the CPA) with a common
mental health problem
28 Para 39
29 ibid; see also paragraphs 14 and 22 of the judgment
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assessment”. The serious and demonstrable error evident in the approach taken to the fundamental
underlying questions must invalidate both parts of the process30.
The judgment concluded31 that there had never been a proper and comprehensive community care
assessment of Mr P, only a CPA assessment, and in relation to Mr P’s community care assessment,
the process must begin again. 
The Law
Given the complexity of the facts, and the importance of the issue of Mr P’s diagnosis in the
resolution of this case, it is perhaps hardly surprising that the factual discussion should have
figured so prominently in this judgment. It is nevertheless unfortunate that the relevant law and
guidance were not afforded greater elaboration, as a judicial analysis would have strengthened the
decision against future challenges and provided greater clarity for future claimants and their legal
advisers. The judge’s thoughts on the distinction between the basis for community care
assessments and CPA assessments would have been especially useful.
The Nature of Community Care Services
These are services which a local authority can provide or arrange, under powers contained in
“community care” legislation32, for the benefit of specified classes of people, who are subject to
health problems or disabilities which increase their need for care or support. Common examples
include the provision of residential accommodation under section 21 of the National Assistance
Act 194833; provision of support services under section 29 of the same Act34; provision of
recreational facilities and practical adaptations to the home under section 2 of the Chronically Sick
and Disabled Persons Act 197035; and the provision of after-care services under section 117 of the
Mental Health Act 198336. 
In the case of the section 117 after-care services37, a joint duty is imposed on both the health and
social services authorities:
30 Para 40
31 Para 41
32 Listed in section 46(3) National Health Service and
Community Care Act 1990, as: Part III National
Assistance Act 1948; section 45 Health Services and
Public Health Act 1968; section 21 and Schedule 8
National Health Service Act 1977; and section 117
Mental Health Act 1983
33 For “persons aged eighteen years or over who by reason
of age, illness, disability or any other circumstances are
in need of care and attention which is not otherwise
available to them” and for “expectant and nursing
mothers who are in need of care and attention not
otherwise available”
34 Under section 29(1) “... the local authority shall make
arrangements for promoting the welfare of ... persons
aged eighteen or over who are blind, deaf or dumb or
who suffer from mental disorder of any description,
and other persons aged eighteen or over who are
substantially and permanently handicapped by illness,
injury, or congenital deformity ...”
35 See section 29(1) National Assistance Act 1948 for
people to whom the section 2 CSDPA 1970 duty
applies. Section 28A extends the duty to disabled
children in relation to whom a local authority have
functions under Part III Children Act 1989 “as it
applies in relation to persons to whom section 29 of the
National Assistance Act 1948 applies.” Services
provided under the Chronically Sick and Disabled
Persons Act 1970 are now regarded as community care
services: Wyatt v. London Borough of Hillingdon
[1976] LGR 727, although this continues to take place
via the `gateway’ of section 29 National Assistance
Act 1948, see R v. Powys County Council ex parte
Hambidge (1998) 40 BMLR 73, Court of Appeal
(1999) 45 BMLR 203
36 See also National Health Service Act 1977, paragraph
2(1), Schedule 8 
37 According to section 117 (1) Mental Health Act 1983:
those eligible to receive these services have left hospital
after ceasing to be detained under sections 3, 37, 45A,
47 and 48 of the Act
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“It shall be the duty of the [Primary Care Trust or] [Health Authority] and of the local social
services authority to provide, in co-operation with relevant voluntary agencies, after-care
services for any person to whom this section applies until such time as the [Primary Care Trust
or] [Health Authority] and the local social services authority are satisfied that the person
concerned is no longer in need of such services ...”38
Some community care legislative provisions are expressed in mandatory language, imposing a duty
on the responsible authorities, such as section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983. Others
introduce nothing more than a power to provide the services, although this has sometimes been
converted subsequently to a duty39.
The purpose of these provisions, it could be said, is to ensure, by the provision of services, a
minimum quality of life for an individual in the community, whether at home or elsewhere;
sometimes the purpose is to enable him or her to live independently away from hospital or
residential care40. It is however difficult to find a universal purpose here as there appear to be no
unifying principles underlying what has been described as a “hotchpotch of conflicting statutes”41.
A Two-Stage Process: (i) The Duty to Assess and the Right to an Assessment
The local authority must carry out an assessment of a person’s needs for community care services
if section 47(1) National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 applies:
“... where it appears to a local authority that any person for whom they may provide or arrange for
the provision of community care services may be in need of any such services, the authority – 
(a) shall carry out an assessment of his needs for those services; and
(b) having regard to the results of that assessment, shall then decide whether his needs call
for the provision by them of any such services.”
Section 47(1) clearly indicates the existence of a two-stage process: an assessment of that person’s
needs (the “needs assessment”), which a local authority is obliged to carry out; followed by a
decision as to whether those needs can be met by, and are such as to warrant, provision of any
community care services (the “service provision decision”). 
The first stage, the duty to assess, arises on the `appearance of need’42: “where it appears ... that any
person ... may be in need ...”. There need be no proof or certainty that the person definitely does
need the services43: the possibility that they may need them is sufficient to put the authority on
notice that an assessment is required. This duty may be triggered by a request from a potential
service user or a carer; but a request is not essential: it is probably sufficient that a local authority
38 Section 117(2), as amended by the Health Authorities
Act 1995, section 2(1), Schedule 1, para 107(8)
39 The power to provide accommodation under section 21
National Assistance Act 1948 has been converted to a
duty by directions, see circular LAC (93) 10 Appendix
1; likewise, the power to provide services under section
29, see circular LAC 93(10) Appendix 2.
40 The Code of Practice to the Mental Health Act 1983
takes the view with respect to section 117 Mental
Health Act 1983 after-care that “a central purpose of
all treatment and care is to equip patients to cope with
life outside hospital and function there successfully
without danger to themselves or other people”: para
27.1, Code of Practice, third edition, Department of
Health and Welsh Office, 1999. There are striking
similarities with the purpose of the Care Programme
Approach: see discussion below
41 See Luke Clements, Community Care and the Law, p.
8, third edition, Legal Action Group, 2004
42 Luke Clements, op. cit., pp. 62–68
43 See also Richard Gordon and Nicola Mackintosh,
Community Care Assessments: A Practical Legal
Framework, p. 21, second edition, published by FT
Law & Tax, 1996
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has the knowledge, from whatever source, that a person may be in need of community care
services44. The availability of resources should not be considered at the point of determining the
need to assess, as the obligation to assess is triggered once an applicant has crossed the threshold
test that there may be some need for a community care service45.
A Two-Stage process: (ii) The Service Provision Decision
The duty to carry out the second stage of the process, the service provision decision, is introduced
by section 47(1)(b) of the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990. The decision is
taken once the needs assessment is complete and discretion is exercised, including resource
considerations, as to how to match the services available, or any potential services which could be
provided46, to the needs identified47. Guidance on the eligibility of individuals for services has been
produced by the Department of Health48, which proposes four eligibility bands according to the
level of an individual’s needs, with each authority setting the level of provision for each band and
taking resources into account49. 
The Care Programme Approach
The Care Programme Approach (CPA) embodies the basic principles governing the discharge from
care and continuing care of all people diagnosed with a mental illness, including dementia.
Relevant guidance states that the same approach should also be applied to the after-care of other
“mentally disordered” patients50. The CPA was required to be introduced by authorities in 199151.
There need not have been a Mental Health Act detention in order for the CPA to apply52. Neither
does a person need to have been in hospital53. It provides a framework for the care of mentally ill
people outside hospital54. It is intended to apply to all those receiving treatment and care from
specialist psychiatric services55. The guidance is explicit on the point that those who have been
44 Virginia Bottomley, HCD, 15/2/1990, col.1025,
mentioned by Michael Mandelstam, in Community
Care Practice and The Law, second edition, p. 73,
Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1999
45 R v. Bristol City Council ex parte Penfold (1998) 1
CCLR 315
46 The assessment should consider whether there is a
potential need for all services the local authority has an
obligation or a power to provide, not only those which it
provides currently: R v. Berkshire County Council ex
parte Parker [1998] 1 CCLR 141
47 However see the Gloucestershire litigation, especially in
relation to provision of services under section 2
Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970,
where resources may be a relevant consideration in
establishing whether this is a “need” which must be
met: R v. Gloucestershire County Council ex parte
Barry [1996] 4 All ER 421 (Court of Appeal); [1997]
2 All ER 1 (House of Lords)
48 Circular LAC (2002) 13, Fair Access to Care Services
– Guidance on Eligibility Criteria for Adult Social Care
49 Luke Clements argues that community care service
provision has developed in a way which is now more
`resource’ than `rights’ oriented: Community Care and
the Law, p. 6, third edition, Legal Action Group, 2004
50 Health Service Guidelines HSG (94) 27, para 7. The
Guidance also states that the CPA circular (see note 51
below) applies only to mentally ill people, but the good
practices promoted by the CPA “are equally relevant” to
those diagnosed with personality (or psychopathic)
disorders who can be “safely and suitably” cared for by
specialist psychiatric services in the community, para
20. Likewise, similar arrangements may need to be
considered in respect of some people with learning
disabilities discharged from in-patient care, para 21
51 Health Circular (90)23/Local Authority Social
Services Letter (90)11. It appears, however, that strictly
speaking it is purchasers of mental health services who
bear the bulk of the responsibility of ensuring
successful local implementation of the CPA, as it is
they who are to ensure that key elements of the CPA
are implemented through contracts with providers:
HSG (94) 27, paras 39 and 40
52 HSG (94) 27, para 8
53 ibid, para 9
54 Building Bridges: A guide to arrangements for inter-
agency working for the care and protection of severely
mentally ill people, Department of Health, November
1995, para 1.3.4
55 Code of Practice to the Mental Health Act 1983, op.
cit, para 27.2 
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detained under, and discharged from, certain sections of the Mental Health Act 1983 may fall
within both the statutory after-care regime under section 117 Mental Health Act 1983 and the care
programme procedure56. Thus the community care provisions and the CPA are not mutually
exclusive. There is nothing to indicate that an individual could not be subject to both processes.
However, some individuals will be subject to one process, but not to the other57.
The purpose of the CPA is stated to be “to ensure the support of mentally ill people in the
community thereby minimising the possibility of their losing contact with services and maximising
the effect of any therapeutic intervention”58. The essential elements of an effective care programme
include:
 systematic assessment of health and social care needs both in the immediate and longer term;
 a written care plan agreed between professionals, the “patient” and carers;
 the allocation of a key worker (nowadays a care co-ordinator59) who will co-ordinate the process
by keeping in touch with the patient and monitoring delivery of the agreed programme of care;
and,
 a regular review of any progress made by the patient and his or her health and social care
needs60.
Priority is to be given to the most severely mentally ill patients61.
The Guidance stresses the importance of systematic recording of decisions and actions and of
clear arrangements for communication between members of the care team62. Great concern is
expressed regarding the need for continuity of care and for the avoidance of gaps in service
provision (“falling through the net”63) owing to poor co-ordination of services or communication.
This is to be achieved by introducing and maintaining co-ordinated arrangements for inter-agency
working64.
Finally the Guidance indicates that an overlap does exist between the CPA arrangements and a local
authority’s statutory duty to assess needs for community care services under the National Health
Service and Community Care Act 1990, as this duty, it suggests, will be fulfilled if a multi-disciplinary
assessment under the CPA is implemented properly65. Health and Social Services authorities will
need to ensure proper co-ordination between CPA and care management arrangements66, as it has
been suggested that “one way of looking at the CPA is as a specialist variant of care management
56 HSG (94), para 8
57 For example, those who could be subject to the CPA but
not section 117 Mental Health Act 1983 after-care
planning include those discharged from a section 2
Mental Health Act detention, those discharged from
voluntary in-patient care, and those who have always
received medical treatment for mental health problems in
the community; see section 117(1) for further details of
who falls within the authorities’ duty to provide after-care
58 HSG (94) 27, para 9; see also Building Bridges, op.
cit., para 1.3.6 
59 Effective Care Co-ordination in Mental Health
Services: Modernising the Care Programme Approach,
Department of Health, 1999, paras 26, 60
60 HSG (94) 27, para 10
61 ibid, para 40
62 ibid, para 11
63 ibid, para 14
64 ibid, paras 14 and 15; part of this strategy in relation
to higher-risk patients would have been their inclusion
on a supervision register (although these have since
been withdrawn, see footnote 69): Code of Practice to
the Mental Health Act 1983, 1999, at para 27.6
65 See Building Bridges, op. cit., para 1.3.8; but the
author doubts whether this can be true in every case, see
discussion post
66 HSG (94) 27, para 16; ‘care management’ has been
defined in Building Bridges in Appendix 1.1 as
applying to “all people subject to the CPA who have
associated care needs”
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for people with mental health problems”67. Moreover since April 2001 the CPA has been
integrated with care management to form a single approach for adults with mental health
problems68, with different levels of CPA now in existence69 to cater for simpler or more complex
needs70.
Comment
The cogent and well-reasoned judgment in this case highlights the very serious consequences for
the individual which may flow from an inadequate appreciation on the part of public bodies, of the
nature and purpose of processes in which their legal duties oblige them to engage. Happily, on this
occasion, the right decision was reached. Injustice to the Claimant and a potential breach of his
rights were averted. Mr P’s case was sent back to the Authority for a fresh assessment, from which
a more promising outcome could be awaited. What remains is to seek to understand why the
confusion between the two processes arose, when they have been in operation for the past decade71,
and to expand on the implications of this. 
It cannot be denied that similarities do exist between the two processes and that they can be
confused. They may appear to fulfil similar aims72, answer the same needs, and can involve the
same patients, and the same professionals. They are alike in imposing no legal obligations on
recipients of services73. Notwithstanding these apparent similarities, it is submitted that there exist
important and fundamental differences in terms of creation and underlying purpose.
The CPA process is a strategy introduced by guidance and, unlike community care service
provision, has never had a statutory basis74. A CPA assessment is not driven by the need to comply
with a source of legal authority75; it is not clear what sanction a failure to undertake it would
attract. 
67 Building Bridges, op. cit., para 3.2.8
68 Effective Care Co-ordination in Mental Health
Services: Modernising the Care Programme Approach,
Department of Health, 1999, paras 21, 35 to 40; also
National Service Framework for Mental Health,
Department of Health, 1999; e.g. there should be a
single care plan and a single key worker for each
person, and any duplications between care
management and CPA resolved: Building Bridges, op.
cit., para 3.2.12 
69 E.g. `standard’ and `enhanced’ levels of CPA :
Effective Care Co-ordination in Mental Health
Services, op. cit., paras 24, 56–58; see also Building
Bridges, op. cit., paras 3.2.2 to 3.2.5; enhanced CPAs
now supersede use of the supervision register, Effective
Care Co-ordination, paras 25, 59
70 A patient with less complex needs should still receive
an assessment, not necessarily multi-disciplinary, and a
care plan: Building Bridges, op. cit., para 3.1.6; there
is a right to a thorough assessment of needs, Effective
Care Co-ordination in Mental Health Services, op.
cit., para 18
71 They both date from 1990: Health Circular
(90)23/Local Authority Services Letter (90)11 and the
National Health Service and Community Care Act
1990
72 “The care programme approach is being developed ...to
ensure that ... future patients treated in the community
... receive the health and social care they need, by ...
ensuring proper arrangements are made ... for the
continuing health and social care of those patients ...”
HC (90) 23/LASSL (90) 11, para 4
73 There is scant legal authority for this proposition but it
is one which finds favour with other commentators:
Richard Gordon and Nicola Mackintosh, op.cit., p.23;
but as for the right to refuse an assessment, see Luke
Clements, op.cit., p. 64
74 Circulars not issued under section 7 Local Authority
Social Services Act 1970 were treated as strongly
persuasive rather than binding in nature, but since the
case of R. v. Islington Borough Council ex parte Rixon
[1998] 1 CCLR 119, the position seems to be that the
guidance contained in them should not be departed
from without good reason
75 Introducing the Care Programme Approach placed no
new requirement to provide services on health or social
services authorities: Circular HC (90) 23/LASSL (90)
11, para 1
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The CPA singles out the “mentally ill” for attention and particularly prioritises those who have
been diagnosed as “severely mentally ill”76. Its overriding concern is for those judged to be at risk
of losing contact with the services77. It seeks to introduce systems designed to avoid this possibility,
chiefly through the co-ordination of administrative procedures for recording, monitoring and
reviewing meetings between professionals and service users, and for following up any gaps or
anomalies uncovered by these measures. The use of supervision registers was an important
example of the thinking behind this strategy: a sort of tracking or ‘keeping tabs on’ exercise. The
details of eligibility criteria for care under the CPA may vary between authorities. The Department
of Health has stated that the Care Programme Approach is an approach, and nothing more, and
that the NHS Executive will not prescribe exactly what should happen at a local level78.
Community care service provision is more likely to give rise to legal duties and obligations79, and
even where it does not appear to do so, it is still clearly underpinned by the community care
legislation. This means that where an authority has a power to act, but not a duty, it must still
exercise its discretion whether or not to use the power. This is a decision which must be made in
accordance with the principles of administrative law80. Here there was, however, a duty to assess
and not merely a power.
The question arises of whether there was an ‘appearance of need’ which would have triggered the
duty to assess Mr P under the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990. Both the
purpose and target group of the legislation here, it is submitted, are broader in scope than those
within the Care Programme Approach guidance. The language of section 47(1) National Health
Service and Community Care Act 1990 is couched in appropriately inclusive terms:
“... where it appears to a local authority that any person for whom they may provide or arrange for the
provision of community care services81 may be in need of any such services, ... the authority shall carry
out an assessment ...”
Although there is a single gateway to obtaining community care services – the needs assessment –
for an individual in a given situation there may be a variety of ways of satisfying the legal criteria
for obtaining services. For the same individual there may be only one set of criteria to be satisfied
under the Care Programme Approach, but this should not be surprising considering its self-
avowed singleness of purpose. A set of eligibility of criteria which filters out those with a less
acutely urgent need of treatment and monitoring reflects that purpose perfectly. If a person fails
to satisfy these criteria, however tightly drawn, he or she will simply be treated as “discharged”,
thereafter to disappear from the CPA picture, regardless of any appearance of need for community
care or health services.
76 See footnote 61
77 In the second edition of his book (Legal Action Group,
2000) (at page 185) Luke Clements stated that the
CPA is dominated by `risk assessment’ issues and is
targeted especially at those eligible for section 117
Mental Health Act 1983 after-care services
78 Building Bridges, op. cit, at para 1.3.6
79 E.g. section 47(1) National Health Service and
Community Care Act 1990: “where it appears to a
local authority that any person ... may be in need of
any such services, the authority ... shall carry out an
assessment ...; and ... shall then decide whether his
needs call for the provision by them of any such
services.” Section 117(2) Mental Health Act 1983: 
“it shall be the duty of the ... [Health Authority] and
the local social services authority to provide ... after-
care services ...”
80 See Clements, op.cit., p. 10
81 Emphasis supplied
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Conclusion
This latter hurdle appears to have been the one which Mr P failed to clear. He failed to satisfy the
authorities that he suffered from one of the illnesses listed in the criteria, with a risk of self-harm
or harm to others serious enough to have warranted consideration for hospital admission during
the preceding two years. Yet had a true community care assessment been carried out, it is possible
to argue that, for example, he need only, to have qualified for support services under section 29
National Assistance Act 1948, have demonstrated the presence of a “mental disorder of any
description”82, arguably a far easier test for him to have satisfied, but for which he was never
assessed.
There are many factors within the knowledge of the Local Authority which could have constituted
the `appearance of need’ of community care services necessary to trigger the duty to carry out an
assessment. These include Mr P’s reactions to his traumatic experiences in Kosovo, resulting in
medical evidence for the existence of post traumatic stress disorder symptoms. These undoubtedly
affected his ability to function and to cope with the normal demands of life in a new country, as
there seems to have been common agreement, at least on this point, that without the support of
his family, Mr P could not have survived here. There was evidence for ongoing depressive
symptoms, notwithstanding the Authority’s verdict that this was not a severe and enduring mental
illness. The possibility of dementia and head injury were also mentioned. In spite of the difficulties
of confirming the precise psychiatric diagnosis, with conflicting evidence for and against the
presence of a serious mental illness, Mr P’s `statement of need’ demonstrated clearly the presence
of needs which could have been met by community care service provision. Finally, assessments
prepared in March 2003 identified him as at risk of “severe self-neglect” and “vulnerable to
deterioration in his mental state”.
These were the material factors which should have triggered the duty to carry out an assessment.
Astonishingly, none of them succeeded in doing so. Not only did the Authority in this case err in
rejecting him for consideration for community care service provision on the basis of his eligibility
under the Care Programme Approach; the much more serious procedural error and fundamental
breach of statutory duty was in failing completely to consider carrying out a proper assessment
under section 47 National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990, which does not require any
consideration of the CPA eligibility criteria. The result was to leave the Claimant, assessed as being
at risk and vulnerable to deterioration by the Authority itself, entirely devoid of any support apart
from that provided by his family, to whom the whole responsibility of his care was thus consigned.
It is a cause of great concern that such a wholesale misunderstanding of the law should occur at
all, and that the effect of an apparent legal compliance on the part of authorities could potentially
be to render many individuals like Mr P invisible to the services until such time as they seek
redress, or their health and ability to care for themselves deteriorate to the extent that their cases
are re-considered. It is perhaps time to press for the drafting of guidance which would set out
clearly all the duties which local authorities may have to assess an individual’s needs of community
care services, the sources of those duties, and the factors which should be considered during the
assessment process.
82 Section 29(1)
